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Executive Summary
In this paper, we calculate the consequences for health spending and the
federal budget of an above-the-line deduction for out-of-pocket health
spending. We show how the response of spending to this expansion in
the tax preference can be specified as a function of a small number of
behavioral parameters that have been estimated in the existing litera-
ture. We compare our estimates to those from other researchers. And,
we use our analysis to derive some implications for tax policytoward
HSAs.
1.Introduction
As Pauly's (1986) classic review shows, virtually all observers of health
policy since Feldstein's (1973) seminal article have agreed that the tax
preference for employer-provided health insuranceunder which
employer contributions to employee health insurance are deductible
to the employer and non-taxable to the employeeencourages over-
consumption of health services in the United States. By making health
spending in general, and insured health spending in particular, appear
less costly than they are, the tax preference gives employees the incen-
tive to take compensation as health insurance rather than cash, even if
they would otherwise prefer not to.
Both the budget cost of the tax preference, and its potential implica-
tions for efficiency in markets for health services, are large. Table 3.1
provides three estimates of the federal revenue loss from the tax pref-
erence in 2004. Shiels and Haught (2004) estimate the revenue loss to
be $188.5 billion. According to them, the loss from the exclusion from
the personal income tax base of employer contributions to employee66 Cogan, Hubbard, and Kessler
Table 3.1
Cost to the Federal Budget of Existing Tax Preferences for Health Spending 2004
(in billions of dollars)
Note: Three studies' estimation methods differ slightly; see Shiels and Haught (2003) for
discussion.
health insurance alone was $114.7 billion. The Joint Committee on Tax-
ation (2003) estimates this loss to be slightly less ($101.0 billion); the
Department of the Treasury in the Office of Management and Budget
(0MB 2003) estimates it to be slightly more ($123.9 billion). Everyone
agrees, however, that it dwarfs the revenue loss from all other health
tax preferences (such as the deduction for health spending in excess
of 7.5 percent of adjusted gross income), and indeed is the single larg-
est tax preference in the federal budget. According to the Department
of the Treasury in 0MB (2003), the loss from the employer exclusion
surpasses the loss from the deductibility of mortgage interest, state and
local property taxes, and all capital gains tax preferences. Indeed, the
only personal tax preferences that come close are the various exclusions
for retirement savings contributions.
Table 3.2 presents trends in health spending by payor and form of
spending for 1993-2003. The table documents the well-known growth
in the magnitude of real spending over this period; Particularly note-
worthy is the change in the form of health spending, from (largely tax-
able) out-of-pocket to tax-preferred insured spending. According to the
table, real employer and employee payments for insured health spend-
ing rose about 50 percent over the period, while out-of-pocket spending







US Treasury in 0MB
(2003)
Total $188.5
Exclusion of employer contribution
to HI premiums from...
Social security payroll tax base $52.2
Medicare payroll tax base $14.2
Personal income tax base $114.7 $101.0$123.9
Deduction for out-of-pocket expenses in
excess of 7.5% of adjusted gross income
$7.4 $5.9 $6.3Tax Preferences on Health Care Spending and Federal Revenues 67
Table 3.2
Health Spending, by Payor and Form of Spending 1993-2003 (in billions of 2003 dollars)
Source: Health United States (2005), table 127, deflated with the CPI.
insured spending is subject to a greater degree of moral hazard, then
the impact of the preference on efficiency could be substantial.
Taken together, these factors have led academic researchers to focus
on the consequences of revoking the taxpreference. Yet, policymak-
ers over the past 30 years have taken analternative approach; they
have sought to level the tax playing field by expanding the taxprefer-
ence rather than eliminating it.' In 1978, changes tosection 125 of the
Internal Revenue Code allowed health expenditures made through an
employer-provided Flexible Spending Account (FSA) to be deductible
to the employer but nontaxable to the emp1oyee.2 In 1996,the Health








Employer contribution to HI premiums $205.1 $237.2$320.656.3%
Employer payments of Medicare payroll taxes $45.5 $60.8 $64.341.4%
Workers' compensation and other $30.4 $27.1 $38.125.5%
Household $367.5$423.5$512.639.5%
Employee contribution to HI premiums $110.4$129.5$174.157.8%
Employee payments of Medicare payroll taxes $55.5 $78.2 $86.055.0%
Individual payments of Medicare SMI premiums $15.1 $17.5$22045.6%
Out-of-pocket spending $186.6$198.4$230.523.6%
Other Private $46.0 $58.2 $56.623.1%
Public $393.1$450.5$622.058.2%
Federal Government $223.0 $243.0$344.054.3%
Employer contributions to HI premiums $14.6 $12.9 $19.734.9%
Medicaid $99.2 $115.0$160.962.2%
Medicare (net of payroll tax receipts) and other $106.2$112.3$160.250.9%
State and Local Government $170.1$207.5$278.163.5%
Employer contributions to HI premiums $48.5 $55.1 $86.277.7%
Medicaid $58.2 $83.1$111.892.2%
Other $57.2 $61.9 $71.525.1%68 Cogan, Hubbard, and Kessler
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act allowed employees of
small businesses who were covered by certain high-deductible health
plans (HDHPs) to make tax-free contributions to a Medical Savings
Account (MSA). Funds from an MSA can be withdrawn, tax free, to
pay for medical expenses in the present or the future; if used for other
purposes after age 65, MSA distributions are taxed as ordinary income.
Under Treasury regulations issued in 2002, sections 105 and 106 of the
Internal Revenue Code allow health reimbursement accounts (HRAs)
to reimburse employees for medical expenses with before-tax dollars,
without the use-it-or-lose-it provision of section 125 cafeteria plans.3 In
2003, the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Moderniza-
tion Act allowed employers and individuals with any HDHP to make
tax-free contributions to a health savings account (HSA). President
Bush has proposed expanding the use of HSAs by liberalizing their
contribution limits.
Conditional on the tax preference for insurance remaining in place,
the consequences of these expansions for health spending, andeco-
nomic efficiency, are theoretically indeterminate. Expanding the tax
preference has two opposing effects. First, expansion lowers the overall
price of health care relative to other goods and services, which increases
distortionary spending. Second, expansion raises the price of purchas-
ing health care through insurance relative to out-of-pocket. The second
effect induces people to shift to health plans with higher deductibles
and coinsurance rates, which, in turn, lowers distortionary spending.
Thus, assessing the effects of expanding the tax preference to out-of-
pocket spending is important for evaluating existing and proposed tax
policies toward health care. Yet, very little work has sought to estimate
these effects and to understand their sensitivity to assumptions about
the demand for health services and insurance. In this paper, we present
a simplified version of the approach in John Cogan, R. Glenn Hubbard,
and Daniel Kessler (CHK 2005) to calculating the effects of an above-
the-line deduction for out-of-pocket health spending, which we term
"full deductibility." In that paper, we show how the response of total
health spending to an expansion in the tax preference can be specified
as a function of a small number of behavioral parameters that have
been estimated in the existing literature. This paper expandson that
work in three ways. First, it calculates the effects of full deductibility
on out-of-pocket spending, total spending, and the government budget
under a range of parameter values. Second, it compares our estimatesTax Preferences on Health Care Spending and Federal Revenues 69
to those from other researchers. Third, it uses our analysis to derive
some implications for tax policy toward HSAs.
2.Assessing the Effects of Tax Deductibility on Health Spending
As reviews by Pauly (1986) and, more recently, Selden and Moeller
(2000) show, a substantial body of research has sought to assess the
effects of revoking the tax preference for employer-provided health
insurance. Considerably less work has focused on the effects of extend-
ing the preference to out-of-pocket spending. Jack and Sheiner (1997)
simulate the effects on insurance policy choice, health spending, and
efficiency of both revoking and extending the tax preference. Those
authors show that extending deductibility might actually reduce health
spending and improve efficiency, by leading to such a large increase in
the effective coinsurance rate that the gain from the reduction in moral
hazard swamps the loss from the reduction in the overall price of health
care. A recent working paper by Jack, Levinson, and Rahardja (2005)
provides empirical support for this hypothesis. They show that, cor-
recting for selection effects, FSAs are associated with effective coinsur-
ance rates that are about 7 percentage points higher, relative to asample
average coinsurance rate of 17 percent. This finding suggests that mak-
ing out-of-pocket health spending deductible, which an FSA effectively
does, would significantly change the form of the average health insur-
ance contract.
In CHK (2005), we derive the relationship between the impact on
health spending of making out-of-pocket expenses tax deductible and
two parameters from economic studies: the price elasticity of health
spending, and the elasticity of the coinsurance rate with respect to the
tax preference for insured spending. We specify health spendingEas
a function of the after-tax price of health services relative to allother
goods p and the tax preference for out-of-pocket spending relative to
insured spendingt0/t, E(p,t0/t). In a world without taxes, p is the price
of health services p'. In a world with tax preferences, p is p multiplied
by the weighted average of the tax preferences for out-of-pocket spend-
ingt0and insured spendingt,p* x[ct + (1 - c) tJ,wheret0andtare
weighted by the quantity shares of out-of-pocket and insured spend-
ing c and (1 - c), respectively. The share c can also be thought of as the
coinsurance ratethat is, the share of spending out-of-pocket in the
absence of tax preferences.70 Cogan, Hubbard, and Kessler
So
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Then the sum of these two equations, in elasticity terms, is:
dE/EdE/EE/Ep/pE/E t0E/E
dt0 / t0dt / tp / pt0 / t0(t0 / t)tp / p
E/E
t / t(t / t)t.
or
dE/E dE/EE/Ep/pap/p1
dt0 / t0 + dt / t = ap /
X




e(t0) + e(t)=e(p) x [1 + O(t0, t, p°)J,
where e(t0) is the elasticity of spending with respect to the tax prefer-
ence for out-of-pocket spending; e(t) is the elasticity of spending with
respect to the preference for insured spending; and e( p) is the price elas-
ticity of spending.
In CHK (2005), we show that under reasonable assumptions and cur-
rent market conditions and tax preferences,4(.) is small, so
e(t0) + e(t1)e(p).
Finally, we translate the results from previous studies into these terms.
For example, the equation above can be rewritten as
e(t,) + (e(c) x e(c,t1))e(p)
where e(c) is the elasticity of spending with respect to the coinsurance
rate and e(c,t1) is the elasticity of the coinsurance rate with respect toTax Preferences on Health Care Spending and Federal Revenues 71
the tax preference for insured spending. If demand curves are locally
linear, then e( p) = e(ap) for any positive constant a, so e( p) = e(c), which
implies:
e(t,)e(p) x (1 - e(c,t1)).
Assessing the effects of extending deductibility thus requires esti-
mates of e( p) and e(c,t1).. There is a range of estimates of e( p). Based
on the RAND Health Insurance Experiment, Manningand colleagues
(1987) estimate e(p)0.2 in arc elasticity terms.5 In more recent work,
Eichner (1998, table 1) estimates e(p) = 0.7 (average for all employees
1990-92, also in arc elasticity terms).6 In addition, even the high end
of this range may understate the impact of a market-wide change in
incentives such as extending deductibility All of the estimates of e(p)
are based on responses to individual-level changes in copayments,
which may be smaller than the responses to more widespread changes
in insurance contracts that fundamentally alter how doctors practice
medicine. Finkelstein (2005), for example, shows that the change in hos-
pital spending associated with the introduction of Medicare was far
greater than the elasticities from the RAND Experiment would have
predicted.
Less disagreement surrounds the magnitude of e(c, t). Several stud-
ies have assessed the effect of the tax preference on coinsurance rates.
These can be used to compute e(c, t). Early simulations by Feldstein and
Friedman (1977) suggest that revoking the tax preference for employer-
provided insurance would lead to a doubling in the coinsurance rate
(from approximately 25 to 50 percent). This finding is consistent with
an unpublished estimate by Phelps (1986). More recentwork leads to
virtually the same conclusions. At conservative levels of consumer risk
aversion and e(p), simulations by Jack and Sheiner (1997, table 2) find
that the tax preference for insurance has led optimal coinsurance rates
to shrink from 33-67 percent to 20-30 percent. Assuming an average
marginal (payroll plus income) tax rate of 30 percent,7 revocation lead-
ing to doubling of coinsurance rates from c to 2c implies an e(c, t) in arc
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Table 3.3 presents calculations of the effects of revoking and extend-
ing the income and payroll tax preference for e(p) = -0.2, -0.45, and -0.7
at e(c, t1) = 1.9. The first two rows of table 3.3 present the effects of revok-
ing the income and income-and-payroll tax preference which is simply
e(p)xe(c,tj)xdt
The third and fourth rows of table 3.3 present the effects of extending
the income and income-and-payroll tax preference which is simply
dt e(p) x (1- e(c, ti)) x
0
Our estimates of the effects of tax policy on spending are within the
range of those from other research. For example, according to Gruber
(2002, table 5), removing the income tax subsidy for health insurance
would result in a 32.8 percent decline in health spending, expressed as
a percentage point change from its initial value. Expressed as a percent-
age-point change at the average (in order to make his estimate compa-
rable to those in table 3.1), this amounts to a 39.2 percent declinelarger
than the 31.8 percent decline in spending that we would predict even
assuming an elasticity of spending with respect to the coinsurance rate
of 0.7. Gruber's estimate, when combined with the consensus estimate
Table 3.3
Effect on Health Spending of Changing the Tax Preference
Note: Assumes a health-spending-weighted average marginal income tax rate of .19,
out-of-pocket-spending-weighted average marginal income tax rate of .14, and an aver-
age payroll tax rate of .13. Average marginal tax rates were calculated using MEPS, and
include both households with and without income tax liabilities.
See CI-IK (2005) for details.
Elasticity of Spending with Respect to
After-Tax Price of Health Care
-0.2 -0.45 -0.7
Effect of revoking:
Income tax preference -9.1% -20.4% -31.8%
Income plus payroll tax preference -30.2% -46.9%
Effect of extending to out-of-pocket:
Income tax preference -2.7% -6.1% -9.5%
Income plus payroll tax preference -19.7%Tax Preferences on Health Care Spending and Federal Revenues 73
of e(c, t) = 1.9, implies that extending the income tax preference to out-
of-pocket spending would result in a decline in overall spending of 11.8
percent.8 According to Jack and Sheiner (1997, table 1), extending the
income and payroll tax preference to out-of-pocket spending would
lead to a decline in spending of 4.9 percent (=0.3/6.15), slightly lower
than the decline in spending that we would predict assuming an elas-
ticity of spending of 0.2.
3.Assessing the Budget Implications of Extending Deductibility
to Out-of-Pocket Spending
In addition to reducing inefficient health spending, full deductibility
reduces federal tax revenues. Deductibility has two effects on rev-
enuesa loss from making previously taxable spending deductible,
and a gain from the shift away from previously deductible health
spending. We do not account for any possible spillover effects from
privately-purchased health care to the Medicare or Medicaid pro-
grams.
The revenue loss consists of two componentsthe loss from allow-
ing the above-the-line deduction of out-of-pocket spending, and the
loss from purchases on health insurance being deducted above-the-line
that are currently not deducted or deductible. The revenue gain also
consists of two components. Tax revenues rise because higher policy
deductibles will translate into a shift in employees' compensation away
from excludable health spending to taxable wages.9 The government
picks up both payroll and income taxes on the portion of the wage
increase directed to non-health spending (first component), and payroll
taxes on the portion directed to out-of-pocket health spending (second
component).
Table 3.4 presents our calculations of these losses and gains on an
annual basis, in 2004 dollars. The top panel of the table shows the two
components of the gross losses from full deductibility; the middle panel
shows the two components of the gross gains; and the bottom panel
shows the intermediate steps underlying the calculation of each of the
components of the gross gains.
As the top panel shows, the gross losses are a mechanical conse-
quence of the policy; they do not depend on behavior. We calculate that
full deductibility would have a gross revenue cost of $26.8 (= $16.4 +
$10.4) billion per year.74 Cogan, Hubbard, and Kessler
Table 3.4
Effect on Tax Revenues of Full Deductibility
Note: Assumes $117b of currently taxable out-of-pocket spending, $74b of current taxed
or taxable insurance payments, $500b of current spending on employer health insurance,
$688b of total private health spending, an average coinsurance rate of 25%, a health-spend-
ing weighted average marginal income tax rate of .19, out-of-pocket spending-weighted
average marginal income tax rate of .14, and an average payroll tax rate of .13. See note to
table 3.1 and CHK (2005) for details on calculation of average marginal tax rates.
The first two rows of the middle panel present estimates of the
first component of gross gains, the increase in tax revenues from the
shift from insured spending to wages. Given the percentage effects on
spending from table 3.3, full deductibility leads to a decline in spend-
ing of $18.4 to $62.3 billion (bottom panel, first row),'° and in turn to an
increase in payroll (income) tax revenues of $2.4 to $8.1 billion ($3.5 to
$11.8 billion).
The third row of the middle panel presents estimates of the second
component of gross gains, the increase in tax revenues from the shift
Elasticity of Spending with




Loss from deduction of taxable out-of-pocket spending -$16.4-$16.4-$16.4




Shift away from health spending
Pickup of payroll taxes $2.4 $5.3 $8.1
Pickup of income taxes $3.5 $7.7 $11.8
Shift away from employer-insured spending toward
out-of-pocket
Pickup of payroll taxes $6.3 $5.3 $4.3
Total -$14.5 -$8.4 -$2.5
Intermediate calculations underlying estimates of revenue gains
Reduction in health spending -$18.4-$40.7-$62.3
New coinsurance rate 33.3% 33.3%33.3%
Reduction in employer-insured spending -$67.2-$81.6-$95.6
Increase in out-of-pocket spending (difference) $48.8 $40.9 $33.3Tax Preferences on Health Care Spending and Federal Revenues 75
from insured to out-of-pocket spending. To calculate this shift, we
make the (conservative) assumption that spending for individuals with
employer-provided health insurance responds to full deductibility the
same as does all private health spending.Under this assumption, the
coinsurance rate that obtains under full deductibility c' (bottom panel,
second row) is equal to
2(i/e(p)) 1 cX[1+
2-O7/e(p))j.1-v
whereis the average marginal tax rate, and2(i/e(p))/[2 - (ii/e(p))] is
the implied rise in the after-tax coinsurance rate necessary to induce the
spending decline from table 3.3. The coinsurance rate under full deduct-
ibility would be 33.3 percent, regardless of the elasticity of demand for
health services, up from a pre-deductibility average of 25 percent. (That
the coinsurance rate does not vary with the elasticity of demand is, of
course, a product of our model's assumption of a constante(c, ti).)
This translates into a decline in spending on employer-provided
health insurance, in percentage terms, of
or in dollar terms, of $67.2 to $95.6 billion (bottompanel, third row).
The increase in out-of-pocket spending subject to the payroll tax (bot-
tom panel, fourth row) is thus the difference betweenthis decline and
the decline in total spending. According to this simple model, then
full deductibility would lead to a significant but plausible increase in
out-of-pocket spending, from $149 billion in 2004 dollars (=$117 billion
in currently non-deductible out-of-pocket spending plus $32 billion
in deductible spending, see CHK (2005, Appendix B)) to $190 billion
(=$149 billion + $41 billion, see column 2), or 27.5 percent (=($190 bil-
lion - $149 billion)/$149 billion).
The calculations presented in table 3.4 make the important point that
much of the gross revenue losses from full deductibility will be made
up by revenue gains from the reduction in the inefficiencydue to the
highly-distortionary existing tax preference. Indeed, even assuming an
elasticity of demand for health services of -0.2, $12.2 billion of the $26.8
billion (or 46 percent) of the losses will be undone; if the elasticity of76 Cogan, Hubbard, and Kessler
demand is 0.45, fully $18.3 bfflion of the $26.8 billion (or 68 percent) of
losses are undone.
4.Implications for Policy toward HSAs
Like full deductibility, allowing HSA contributions to be tax-deduct-
ible gives a tax preference to out-of-pocket spending. Under current
law, a holder of an HDHP (i.e., a health plan with a deductible of at
least $1,050/$2,100 in 2006 (individual/family)) can contribute to an
HSA the amount of the deductible, but not more than $2,700 (individ-
ual) or $5,450 (family).11 The contribution is deductible from federal
income taxes and from income taxes in 44 states.12 If the contribu-
tion is made by a person's employer, it is also excludable from the
Social Security tax base. The contribution accumulates interest tax-
free and is non-taxable on distribution, if, spent on health services; it is
taxable as ordinary income if distributed for any other purpose after
age 65.
HSAs differ from full deductibility in three key ways. First, an indi-
vidual can only have an HSA if they are enrolled in an HDHP. Second,
an individual can deduct HSA contributions from his or her taxable
income up to the amount of their HDHP's deductible, whether or not
they incur any health expenses, but can not deduct more, even if they
have coinsurance payments in excess of the deductible. Third, an HSA
allows an individual to save tax-free for future health expenses or
retirement, whereas full deductibifity only allows deduction of current
health expenses.'3
For consumers who use HSAs only as a vehicle to deduct current
health expenses, the most important difference between HSAs and full
deductibility is the minimum deductible requirement of HDHPs. If, for
these individuals, all of the expenditure-reducing incentive effects of
full deductibility were channeled through insurance policy deductibles
(rather than coinsurance rates), then deductibles would have to rise
from a typical value of $221 (2004 dollars)'4 to approximately $290," far
less than the 2006 mandated HDHP minimum of $1,050. Because HSAs
are indistinguishable from full deductibility for these consumers, this
implies that they would prefer a lower deductible than the mandated
minimum.
Because most taxpayers do not exhaust their existing retirement
savings incentives (CBO 2003), and therefore are likely to treat HSAsTax Preferences on Health Care Spending and Federal Revenues 77
primarily as a vehicle to deduct current expenses, HSAs as currently
formulated will likely be taken up by fewer people than would full
deductibility. However, among HSA enrollees, HSAs bring health
spending much closer to the efficient level (the level that would be pre-
ferred in the absence of any tax preference) than full deductibility. If all
of the expenditure-reducing incentive effects of revoking the income
and payroll tax preferences were channeled through insurance policy
deductibles, then deductibles would rise to approximately $1,680 in
2004 dollars.'6 These back-of-the-envelope comparisons between full
deductibility and HSAs are consistent with empirical studies of HSAs
(see, for example, Melinda Buntin et al. 2005; and Roger Feldman et al.
2005) and MSAs (see, for example, Larry Ozanne 1996; and Emmett
Keeler et al. 1996).
The most efficient way to expand HSAs would be to allow deduct-
ibility of all out-of-pocket payments for people with insurance (not just
those toward the policy deductible), but limit the budget consequences
of HSAs by capping deductible contributions at a fixed dollar amount
(such as $1,000/$2,000 for an individual/family, indexed to inflation)
in excess of current health expenses. Two considerations support this
shift.
First, recall that the back-of-the-envelope calculations above sug-
gest that lowering the minimum deductible requirement is an impor-
tant policy for increasing the take-up rate. For most consumers, the
minimum deductible requirement is simply too high, given the mag-
nitude of the existing tax preference for employer-provided insur-
ance. Allowing people to choose their policy deductible will solvethis
problem. Just as the take-up of managed care had beneficial spillovers
to fee-for-service insurance (for example, Laurence Baker 1997), the
take-up of HSAs and insurance plans with more cost sharing will as
well.
Second, evidence from the RAND Experiment suggests that most of
the expenditure-reducing effects of policy deductibles occur at low lev-
els of deductibles (for example, Emmett Keeler et al. 1988). Extending
deductibility to out-of-pocket expenses above the policy deductible wifi
provide an important incentive for individuals to increase coinsurance
rates as well. The results from the RAND experiment suggest that a
mix of higher deductibles and coinsurance rates would achieve greater
efficiency in health spending than mandating that all of the savings be
channeled through the deductible.78 Cogan, Hubbard, and Kessler
5.Conclusion
The U.S. health care system, the envy of the world in innovation, faces
criticisms from policymakers about the cost of care. From an economic
perspective, an alternative approach is to ask whether private consum-
ers of health careand taxpayers who fund public programsare
obtaining the highest "value" for the resources devoted to health care.
Healthy, competitive markets generally offer the greatest opportunity
to maximize value.
As academic researchers have long observed, limiting or revoking
altogether the tax preference for health insurance would improve the
performance of markets for health services on this dimension. Cur-
rent policy generally allows individuals to receive employer-provided
health insurance expenditures tax-free, but requires direct out-of-pocket
medical spending to be financed from after-tax income. This tax prefer-
ence has given consumers the incentive to purchase health care through
low-deductible, low-copayment insurance instead of out-of-pocket.
However, likely because the vast majority of voters benefit from this
preference, policymakers over the past 30 years have instead sought to
level the tax playing field by expanding the tax preference rather than
eliminating it.
In this paper, we show that extending deductibility to out-of-pocket
spending, while a second-best policy change, is nonetheless likely to
lead to significant improvements in efficiency under a range of assump-
tions about demand for health care and health insurance. Although we
are not the first to recognize this fact, we quantify the actual health
spending and revenue effects of such a policy using a transparent
accounting model and a small number of behavioral parameters from
existing studies.
Providing additional evidence on the sensitivity of health insurance
contracts to tax changes is a subject for future research. Also, while not
emphasized here, expanding deductibility may also significantly reduce
rates of uninsurance by lowering the cost of health insurance. Finally,
we view as an important topic for future work more analysis of the rela-
tionship between tax deductibility and Health Savings Accounts.
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Such a pattern likely reflects politics as much as economics: the vast majority of vot-
ers benefit from the excludability of health insurance. When President Reagan expressed
interest in eliminating or even limiting the exclusion, his proposal was soundly rejected
in Congress. Indeed, the Clinton health reform plan explicitly rejected any such limita-
tions (Cutler 1994).
An FSA allows employees to allocate a portion of their compensation to nontaxable
fringe benefits instead of taxable wages. Currently, once the amount of the FSA contribu-
tion has been designated, the employee is not allowed to change it or drop the plan dur-
ing the year unless he or she experiences a change of family status. By law, the employee
forfeits any unspent funds in the account at the end of the year.
HRAs, however, are owned by the employer and contributions to them are subject to
nondiscrimination rules; that is, they can not be at the employee's discretion. See U.S.
Department of Labor (2003).
For example, t0 = 1 and t1 = 0.7.
Because the tax preference leads to large changes in effective prices for health services,
point elasticities expressed in (current) after-tax terms will be very different from those
expressed in (counterfactual) pre-tax terms. For example, the effect of a 1 percent increase
in the effective coinsurance rate from its current (lower) base is much smaller than the
effect of a 1 percent decrease in the effective coinsurance rate from its (higher) base in
the absence of the tax preference. Some of the studies we review provide estimates in the
former terms; some provide estimates in the latter. We follow the convention used in the
RAND study and convert all elasticities into arc terms, expressed at the average between
pre- and post-tax prices.
The published estimates in Eichner (1997, table 1) are based on models that assume
that consumers make marginal health spending decisions throughout the year based
on the coinsurance rate that they face at the end of the year. This assumption is impor-
tant because many plans' coinsurance rates vary with a consumer's level of cumulative
spending over a calendar year. For example, a plan may have a $500 deductible (i.e., a
coinsurance rate of 100 percent on the first $500 of spending), a coinsurance rate of 25
percent, and a $2,000 out-of-pocket maximum (i.e., a coinsurance rate of 0 percent after
$1,500 in coinsurance payments or $6,500 in total spending). If consumers have rational
expectations, then this assumption is correct. Regardless of when in the year the choice
to make a (marginal) health expenditure arises, the effective coinsurance rate for any
marginal expenditure would be the rate in effect after all of the year's expenditures had
occurred. In the text of the article, Eichner points out that esthnates of e(p) from models
that do not assume rational expectations are generally lower. However, in our view, the
rational expectations assumption is more justifiable than the alternatives, so we use the
estimates from the table.
We discuss how we assess the magnitude of the average marginal tax rate in more
detail below.
Gruber's estimate implies e(p) = 0.87 = 0.392 / (1.9* 0.19*21(0.7 + 0.89)), which implies
an effect of 0.118 = _0.87*0.9*2*0.14/(1 + 0.86).80 Cogan, Hubbard, and Kessler
As Gruber (2000) points out, empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that the costs
of health insurance premiums are fully shifted out of wages.
Table 3.3 presents percentage effects measured at the average 17, so the percentage






This summary is taken from the detailed explanation of the tax treatment of HSAs in
Internal Revenue Service (2004).
See National Conference of State Legislatures (2006).
Of course, adoption of full deductibility does not preclude HSAs. Indeed, full deduct-
ibility enhances the incentive to finance current health spending out of pocket, while
HSAs (when used as a savings vehicle) enhance the incentive to accumulate assets to
finance future health expenses out of pocket.
See Gabel and Rice (2003).
We reach this conclusion by using parameters from the RAND Health Insurance
experiment, the approach suggested by Phelps (2003), and the increase in health spend-
ing reported by CMS (2006). In 1984 dollars, the current deductible of $221 would be
equivalent to $44. According to CMS (2006), spending per private health insurance
enrollee rose from $675 in 1984 to $3,379 in 2004, a factor of five. According to Phelps
(2003, table 5.6), to achieve the spending reduction of 2.7 percent from full deductibility
predicted by the RAND Experiment, deductibles would have to have risen to $58 in 1984,
or $290 (=58*5) in 2004.
To achieve the spending reduction of 13.4 percent from revoking the income and
payroll tax preferences predicted by the RAND Experiment, deductibles would have to
have risen to $336 in 1984, or $1,680 (=336*5) in 2004.
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